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Oleh/By : DATO' SERI DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD
Tempat/Venue : THE PAN PACIFIC HOTEL, KUALA LUMPUR
Tarikh/Date : 17/06/89
Tajuk/Title : ADDRESS BY THE HONOURABLE DATO SERI
DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD THE PRIME
MINISTER OF MALAYSIA AT THE THIRD
ASIA-PACIFIC ROUNDTABLE
Distinguished Guests;
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Please allow me to say what a pleasure it is for me to
bid a warm welcome to such a large and august gathering,
meeting in this small capital of a small nation in the
Western Pacific. The fact that we have in this very room
important men and women of thought and action from every
band of the political spectrum bears testimony to the
momentum of peace in the world and the Pacific today.
2. This momentum of peace cannot be taken for granted.
Many of the most promising trends of recent years can be
turned around.
Many things can still go wrong -- through errors of
omission, mistakes in calculation, failures in domestic
and international statesmanship. We ought always to be
reminded that in international relations there are no brave
and benign new worlds and no miracles. We would be foolish
to presume that beyond the age of confrontation which we
have all endured for so long lies, necessarily, a new era of
cooperation.
3. At the same time, there can be no denying that not for
two generations has there been such a positive constellation
of positive political factors in the global firmament. I
put it to you that we have entered into an era of great
transition, affording immense opportunity, demanding of
enlightened action and creative initiative. If we are up
to the imperatives of statesmanship, the dictates of
enlightened action and the challenges of creative
initiative, there is every probability that the last decade
of the twentieth century will - in political terms at
least - be a much better one than what we have seen in the
last fifty years. Again, we must guard against excessive
optimism. But the auguries are good. Allow me to briefly
outline some of the very positive and fundamental changes
that have occurred, sometimes at speeds that test our very
ability to clearly comprehend their contents and their
implications.
Ladies dan gentlemen,
4. When historians write about the Twentieth Century, they
will need to grapple with an explanation of the role that
ideology played globally in the relations between so many
nations over some eight decades, a conflict over ideas and
systems.
5. There has of course never been a time when ideology has
counted for nothing. There will never come a time when it
counts for nothing. In the apparent death throes of the
twentieth century's heroic Age of Ideology, we can expect
some ideological contention between the various believers of
capitalism and between the various believers of the command
economy. We might even expect on occasion sharp
ideological altercation between the leaders and would-be
leaders of what has been the Great Ideological Divide. But
it does seem a safe conclusion that because of the
fundamental reassessment of socialism as a method,
worldwide, and because of a host of other factors, we can at
last expect the passing of the Age of Ideology as we have
known it. More and more, we can expect ideology to be less
and less important in international relations -- as
pragmatism and the traditional imperatives of national
interest come increasingly to the fore.
6. The second, related, positive factor is the process of
internal reform and restructuring amongst the great and the
big powers, the most consequential being the
turning inwards of the great anti
status-quo powers.
7. China was the first to institute a comprehensive
programme, which it called the Four Modernisations. The
recent tragic events in China, not unconnected with the
problems of economic success, are likely to tie the Chinese
leadership down to internal pre-occupations.
8. The Soviet Union, under the ambitious leadership of
Mikhail Gorbachev, is now already knee-deep in an equally
comprehensive and very difficult programme of glasnost and
perestroika. Japan too is in the process of fundamental -
economic and societal - change. The European Community
can be expected to be greatly diverted by the process of
single-market completion by 1992. There are many who expect
the United States itself - under the cautious leadership
of George Bush - to embark on internal re-assessment
intended to re-establish its vitality and strength, and to
re-establish what some have called the Pax Americana.
9. The two superpowers which have sacrificed substantially
because of their strategic overstretch are in the process of
strategic disengagement. Because the costs to the United
States have been of a different order, its reconsideration
of commitments and international activism will be of a
different order. Because the Soviet Union has been the
nation which has paid so dearly for its strategic
overstretch, we have already seen dramatic examples of
disengagement and retrenchment. Great changes are in train
in eastern Europe and in other parts of the globe. The
transformation taking place in the Second World is well
nigh irreversible. We should be equally clear in our minds
that the positive moves of the USSR are largely the result
of internal imperatives arising out of the nation-centric
desire to improve the welfare of the Soviet peoples. This
does not detract, however, from their positive impact on the
global scene. Indeed, it provides a more secure foundation
than would such motivations as an unsustainable starry-eyed
commitment to peace or ideology.
10. Because of all these factors, there are those who
believe that the Cold War between the Political
East and the Political West has now come to an end. I
prefer to cautiously believe that the rumours of the death
of the titanic contest of systems which has been one of the
central hall marks of the Twentieth Century are somewhat
premature. It is still too early to write the epitaph on the
Cold War.
11. But who can deny that there is today a historic
opportunity to once and for all put to an end a conflict
which has engaged so many and so much of the passions of
this century? No one can surely deny that many regional
conflicts are being actively addressed and we have entered a
period of increasing detente. At the global level, there
has been a fundamental reduction of tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
12. In the Pacific, the cold war between Moscow and Beijing
is largely at an end. Although the consequences of the
events in China cannot now be fully fathomed in terms of
international relations, we have in recent months and years
seen some easing of tensions between Beijing and Taipei,
between Beijing and Seoul, between Beijing and Hanoi,
between Bangkok and Hanoi, between Thailand and the other
countries of Indochina, and between these countries and
ASEAN.
13. All this is tied to two other important realities: the
realisation of the limited power that can come
out of barrel of the gun and of the
virtues of extension by other means. In the course of time
and since the dawn of the nuclear age, the very essence of
power has been substantially transformed. What is more,
this is increasingly being perceived by governments and
peoples.
14. There was a time when one scurvy-infested gunboat might
have been enough to topple regimes. Let us not forget the
consequences of four black ships upon Japan. A thin red
line, backed by a thin line of naval power did play an
unbelievable role in the creation of an empire on which the
sun never set.
15. Yet in the world of today, the might of the Americans
was not enough in the case of Vietnam. The
might of the Soviet Union was not enough in the case of
Afghanistan. As many of us have seen with our own eyes, one
solitary man can halt a column of heavy tanks. The two
superpowers are at the peak of their military might, with
almost godlike ability to obliterate every living thing on
this planet many times over, even as their political power
has been on the wane - in a world that has increasingly
become multipolar and promises to be much more so.
16. Although the writing has been on the wall for decades,
it is today writ in such large and bold letters that even
the near illiterate and the myopic can now read the message.
Ladies and gentlemen,
17. The path to disarmament, armed preparedness and
deterrence at lower levels of lethality and higher levels of
sanity will by no means be easy. The military-industrial
complexes can be assured that never will swords be turned
into ploughshares. But we can now expect most nations to
subscribe to the concept of reasonable sufficiency. More
and more governments are likely to come to the conclusion
that enough is enough.
18. Given:
- the increasingly prohibitive financial, political
and other costs of war,
- the increasingly limited circumstances under which
it will appear rational,
- the increasing difficulty generally of converting
military capability into political power,
- the increasing pre-occupation of the big and
superpowers in domestic development and their
increasing awareness of the comprehensive costs of
military overstretch,
- the dramatic attenuation of the Cold War,
- the lessening of tensions at the global, regional
and local plane, and
- the decrease in ideological fervour and passion,
we can reasonably expect fewer international wars and fewer
international wars of size. There are two other reasons why
there are grounds for being optimistic with regard to the
surging tide of peace that is characteristic not only of the
Pacific but also of other parts of the world.
19. The first is the demonstrable efficacy and virtues of
war by other means and national extension by other methods.
The second is the fact that fact that we have entered an
era most likely to be characterised by the primacy of
economics.
20. The world has learnt many lessons from the Japanese
with regard to business and management. Japan has also been
an exemplary state with regard to one important strategic
lesson: that the objectives of a state can be achieved
through the use of economic means -- to the great welfare
and benefit of the subject state and, in most cases, to the
benefit and welfare of the object state.
21. A case can be made that we have already moved into a
period of "soft imperialism" where the foundations of a
nation's power are more likely to rest on brains rather
than brawn, on the creativity, energy
and talent of its people rather than on
the size of its population and the extent of its territory.
22. Increasingly, it can be argued, national prosperity and
political power will hinge not on the lands that an army can
conquer and the number of people that a nation can subjugate
but on the degree of penetration of markets, the extent to
which other peoples are reliant on one's financial flows,
technology and domestic market, the extent to which they are
dependent on the products that one can provide and the
services that one can render. Much of the virtue of this
soft imperialism lies in the fact that the so-called target
may aid and abet and certainly welcome one's national
extension.
23. Again, there is need for caution because what is soft
can become hard. Soft imperialism too can be perverted by
the desire for pomp and glory, and by the will to dominate
and to dictate. But conducted in an enlightened and
therefore sustainable manner, this soft imperialism is not
a zero-sum game. Indeed, it is a process that promises a
wealth of mutual benefit -- because the interest of the
expansionist power is inherently and critically tied to the
comprehensive prosperity of the countries which are its
targets.
24. If I am right and what we will see in the years ahead
are increasing examples of economic expansionism and
decreasing attempts at military expansionism, then
we can expect much more of our
future to be determined by the trading state rather than
by the garrison and the military state.
25. This will contribute to the rise of the primacy of
economics, a trend that cannot but come increasingly to the
fore as ideological passions are dissipated, as the Cold War
winds down, as resort to military means is reduced, as the
big and the superpowers and the small powers turn
increasingly to economic development and social welfare.
There are two other very important reasons why economics
will play an increasing role in the affairs of nations.
26. First, the world is likely to be forced to grapple more
and more with a host of intractable
international economic issues. The statistics testify to
the fact that since the 1960s the trendlines for global
economic growth and international trade growth have been on
a clearly downward path. In the year ahead and in the years
to come most nations will have to deal with the most serious
economic issues because of the mammoth structural imbalances
of the US economy, the primary engine of global growth since
the early 1950s, which must be expected to lose steam. The
problem of increasing protectionism, trade "blocs", currency
volatility, international debt, the malaise of the large
majority of developing countries, will all take the time of
our diplomacy and test the calibre of our domestic and
international economic management.
27. The second reason is also
altogether too clear: the rise of economic
conflict. Many of the root causes of the present economic
friction and of the future escalation of economic
contradictions are plain. It is important here to note a
central paradox of economic conflict at this point in world
history.
28. Whereas in the case of ideological, political and
military conflict, the struggle is most often and most
intensive as between states that are not interdependent and
that are not close, it is in the inherent nature of economic
conflicts that they will be most numerous and most intense
as between states that are closely interdependent and deeply
interpenetrated. Whereas ideological, political and
military conflict has been essentially between adversaries
and enemies, economic conflict is most likely as between
friends and allies. Whereas in the era of ideological,
political and military confrontation what is crucial is the
containment of adversaries and enemies, in an era of
economic conflict the central task is likely to be the
management of friends and allies.
29. What will be the outcome of escalated economic
contradiction in a world where the traditional and
great Communism-Capitalism, East-West conflicts are no
longer the central frame of reference? How will the new
lines of friction and contention be drawn when the old lines
of division are blurred or are no longer fully operative?
Ladies and gentlemen,
30. I have warned against excessive optimism and the need,
as always for complete realism. I think I have hinted that
there are dangerous elements in the evolving strategic
picture which should be cause for serious concern. None
of this detracts from the reality that this is indeed a time
of opportunity. And history will not forgive us if, through
errors of ommission, weakness of purpose, perversity of
vision we allow the opportunities for peace to slip through
our fingers. Allow me to re-iterate: the need of the hour
is for enlightened action and creative initiative.
31. But what must be the elements of such enlightened
action and creative initiative? As the Prime
Minister of a small country, I feel it necessary to stress
that one of the misconceptions that must be jettisoned at
the start is to believe that the smaller states have no role
or no significant role to play. To be sure, in the great
affairs of men, few can make a difference. But all must
try. If it can be said that acquaintanceship with power
tends to corrupt, it can also be said that a sense of
powerlessness also tends to corrupt. The first is the
corruption of power. The second is the corruption of
powerlessness.
32. I believe that there is no nation that is too small to
contribute to peace in the Pacific. In this regard I am
reminded of the ancient Arab saying that if
each man sweeps before his doors,
the whole street will be clean. At the very least,
each nation can contribute to peace if it puts its own house
in order, if it develops its national resilience and if it
seeks the dignity and chooses the high ground of
independence. We can do much more -- without waiting for a
nudge from the big powers, at the behest of our own
persuasion.
33. In Southeast Asia itself, a part of the world that has
been characterised for much too long as a region in turmoil,
we have seen how a group of five states went about to create
a secure zone of peace and freedom for themselves. Since
memories are short perhaps I should remind you that in the
mid-1960s what is now the Asean Community
consisted of states many of which
which did not even know each other, disliked each other or
were in a state of confrontation, cold confrontation or even
hot military conflict. In a creative act of regional
reconciliation, the Asean Five decided to create a
different world for themselves.
34. What exists today is a community, now expanded to six
nations, where there is securely in place a structure of
understanding and trust, goodwill and active cooperation
unprecedented in the history of Southeast Asia. There were
many obstacles in the way and more than just hiccups. But
what we have now firmly established is a Pax Aseana, the
more remarkable because it is a Peace without an imperium.
It might also be noted that the
Asean Community constitutes three quarters of Southeast
Asian real estate. It is where three out of four Southeast
Asians live and where more than nine tenths of Southeast
Asian income is generated.
35. Among the things we have done is to firmly establish an
effective code of inter-state conduct based on the
principles of peaceful co-existence. Central to that
effective code are mutual respect for the sanctity of
borders and absolute intolerance of military aggression.
Asean's horizon from the very beginning was Southeast Asia
as a whole. Its purpose from the very beginning was to
turn a region in turmoil into a region of peace and
cooperative co-existence. It was for this reason that
we would not tolerate and had to oppose the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.
36. Today, we must continue to be patient and to ensure the
total removal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. There is
now every confidence that this will be done by the end of
September. It is important that Hanoi's word be kept. The
traffic cannot move until the obstacle is out of the way.
37. Even as we wait patiently, it is essential for the
Asean states to now hammer out the acceptable modalities and
the most appropriate institutions. We must stand ready to
launch the second phase of regional reconciliation, to
achieve our ultimate objective: the
creation of a Southeast Asian system of states that are
at peace with each other, involved in a dynamic and vigorous
relationship of mutual respect and mutually beneficial
cooperation.
38. We must not be at sixes and threes. The mountain of
distrust and misunderstanding must be removed. A divided
Southeast Asia is not in the interest of any regional state.
It is in the interest of all of Southeast Asia that we
secure a healthy balance of forces, a system open to the
world, composed of states which are economically prosperous,
socially dynamic, strategically secure, domestically at
peace and politically at one.
39. To ensure all this and to prevent hegemonism from any
quarter, we of Asean must be prepared
for a comprehensive and creative engagement of all the large
powers. And we must be prepared for the comprehensive and
creative engagement of Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
40. I strongly urge all the external powers -- from the
north, south, east and west, from the first, second and
third worlds, from the mature states of western Europe and
the new, dynamic states of northeast Asia -- to come to
Southeast Asia to play legitimate and constructive roles
that will be to the benefit of all. I also support fully
the objective of transforming Indochina from a battlefield
into a marketplace, a process in which we in Asean can play
an active role, but a transformation nevertheless
that has to be accomplished by
the states of Indochina themselves.
41. I have stated that so much depends on the removal of
Vietnamese troops. That the Vietnamese must do. But Asean
must be prepared to play a fully constructive role in the
removal of that roadblock and to ensure the emergence of a
Cambodia that is independent, neutral, non-aligned, and very
importantly, peaceful.
42. It would be a tragedy if there is a return to genocidal
policies. The Cambodian people have suffered enough. We
must all do our utmost to prevent the outbreak of civil war.
43. The comprehensive political settlement
that we must work determinedly
towards must be one that is moral, that is viable
and that is productive. Such a solution must recognise
the realities on the ground, in the region, and of
international politics. Such a solution must secure a
meaningful place for Prince Norodom Sihanouk.
44. As the Prime Minister of a small state, I have
necessarily stressed the role that small states can play
with regard to the process of peace in the Asia-Pacific
Region. As a realist, I must emphasise the great role that
the great powers have to play in the process of reducing
tensions, building confidence, and resolving conflicts.
Important though they are, the contribution that
the great powers make must extend
beyond the creation of better atmospherics.
45. The United States and many other states have poured a
great deal of cold water on the Soviet Government Statement
on the Asia-Pacific Region of April 1986, Mr. Gorbachev's
Vladivostock speech of July 1986, his speech to the Indian
Parliament of November 1986, his Merdeka interview of July
1987, his Krasnoyarsk speech of September 1988 and his
United Nations speech of December 1988. To be fair, there
are elements in each of these initiatives which are
cynically self-serving of Soviet interests, worthy of a
place in the recesses of the Cold War. The Krasnoyarsk
speech was made at a critical juncture in the US-
Philippines negotiations over Clark and Subic. How are we to
treat the proposal that Hiroshima be the Helsinki of the
Pacific? Many of the proposals thus far put forward are
deserving of a great deal of cold water and hot
indignation.
46. It is important that good, negotiable proposals are not
contaminated by the company of suggestions that are clearly
mischievous, or that will be seen to be mischievous and
thoroughly cynical. It is essential that the initiator is
fully sensitive to the interests, perspectives and
sensitivities of the other party. It is important that
neither party is thrown on the defensive. It is crucial that
no initiative is seen to be intended specifically for that
purpose.
47. At the same time, many of the moves of the Soviet Union
should not be rejected in toto and are worthy of the most
serious consideration. Mr. Gorbachev's suggestion of prior
notification with regard to big naval exercises and for "the
joint elaboration of measures to prevent incidents in the
open sea and the airspace above it", for example, deserve
serious study. And there truly are possibilities for
measures to enhance confidence and to guard against
accidental military clashes arising out of miscalculation,
misperception and technical mistakes such as we have seen in
the Persian Gulf.
48. Apart from prior notification of major military
manoeuvres, there are possible measures to
increase "transparency" through information exchange. A hot
line between the headquarters of the two superpower military
establishments in the Pacific and regular dialogues between
their military personnel could be of some use; the first in
the context of crisis situations, the second in order to
reduce the present level of ignorance and prejudice on all
sides.
Ladies and gentlemen,
49. Let me conclude by reiterating that we are poised at a
point where we can go beyond confrontation to something
better. But we cannot move from here to there if minds are
closed, if we are unwilling to think new thoughts, and if we
take into a transformed world that will
be the 1990s all the heavy intellectual baggage of the age
of confrontation.
50. It has been said that advice is something that the wise
do not need and that fools will not take. Assuredly, those
who will not be counselled cannot be helped. I hope that I
have not sounded the incurable optimist. I believe that
meetings such as this Third Asia Pacific Roundtable can play
a most constructive role in generating new ideas, in
reducing prejudices, in subverting ignorance, in creating
new atmospherics -- and in coming forth with advice on how
we can all move forward. I have every confidence that
individually or as a group you can play a meaningful role.
We must move effectively forward with regard to confidence
building and conflict reduction in the Pacific and the wider
world. Upon this will hinge the judgement of history and our
hopes for building a better future.
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